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ARTICLE 2 OF THE U.C.C.
AND GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT:
SELECTED AREAS OF DISCUSSION
ROBERT C. GUSMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code' deals with the sale
of goods, replacing, in most jurisdictions, the Uniform Sales Act. The
purpose of Article 2 is to bring sales law closer to the needs and prac-
tices of businessmen. While many of the Sales Act rules have been
retained, they have been modernized and improved to conform more
closely to existing commercial practices. 2
 Article 2 represents an at-
tempt to solve sales problems realistically. It is designed to facilitate
commercial transactions, attaching legal consequences to business
practices rather than forcing businessmen to adapt their practices to
meet legal concepts. 3 Consequently, it has been observed that Article 2
will probably effect a greater change in existing law than any other
article of the Code, with the exception of Article 9, dealing with secured
transactions. 4
In contrast, the body of government-contract laws has been marked
* BA., University College, New York University, 1953; LL.B., Cornell University,
1956; Member, California, District of Columbia, and New York Bars; Member, Amer-
ican Bar Association Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, and the Fed-
eral Bar Association; Attorney, Office of the General Counsel for the Department of the
Navy, 1956-60; Assistant Counsel, Aerojet-General Corporation.
The views expressed herein are the author's and not those of any organization.
1
 Today, the Code has been enacted in fifty-one jurisdictions—all the states, except
Louisiana; the District of Columbia; and the Virgin Islands. All citations are to the
1962 Official Text.
2
 Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code,
1962 U. Ill. L.F. 321, 327-28.
3
 W. Hawkland, Sales and Bulk Sales (Under the Uniform Commercial Code) 1-2
(1958).
4
 Hogan, The Highways and Some of the Byways in the Sales and Bulk Sales Arti-
cles of the Uniform Commercial Code, 48 Cornell L.Q. 1 (1962).
5
 Frequently in this article reference will be made to the procurement regulations of
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by the contract of adhesion.' Such contracts, also used in the area of
insurance and financing agreements, are usually preprinted standard
forms prepared by the dominant party and may be designed to fit a
variety of situations. The dominated party must usually accept the
standard form without bargaining over terms. For example, a con-
tractor will be forced to accept all the terms and conditions called for
by the Government in its boilerplate because of his unequal bargain-
ing power. He has little chance to vary contract terms to meet his own
particular circumstances.
This article will examine the emergence of the Code as an impor-
tant segment of the body of government-contract law. The impact of
the Code in the area of subcontracts will be discussed from the point
of view that, although the Code has received wide acceptance, there
may be cases in which the Code rules would be rejected by courts. We
will compare the rules with respect to firm offers under the Code and
government-contract law Such a comparison will provide a clear-cut
example of the federal rule being in general accord with the Code
principle. Conversely, the rules with respect to formation of contracts
will be compared because they illustrate a situation in which the Code
rule may not permit fulfillment of government policies with respect to
the consummation of contracts. Next,.we will examine the decisions
of the Boards of Contract Appeals (hereinafter referred to as the
Board) which have applied or discussed the implied warranty pro-
visions of the Code. This area, in its present state of development,
brings home the point that contract terms must be construed carefully
to determine the rights and obligations of the parties before the Code
is used. Finally, we will discuss the principles which this author feels
ought most properly to be applied in those cases in which the Code
conflicts with government-procurement regulations.
The correct analysis for determining rights and obligations in
government contracts begins with an examination of the contract's
provisions. Generally, the Government's rights under its contracts are
exclusive and not cumulative. "The cardinal rule is that the contract
means exactly what it says."7 The application of the Code to govern-
ment contracts must proceed from the base established by the contract
the federal government. Two sets of procurement regulations are involved: First, the
Federal Procurement Regulation (FPR), 41 C.F.R. Chapter 1 (1967), applying to all
procurement by federal agencies; second, the Armed Services Procurement Regulation
(ASPR), 32 C.F.R. Chapter 1 (1967), governing purchases by the Department of De-
fense. Since many of their important provisions are identical, we will often refer to only
one of them.
6 Pasley, The Interpretation of Government Contracts: A Plea for Better Under-
standing, 25 Fordham L. Rev. 211, 214 (1956); see 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.009 (1967) (FPR);
32 C.F.R. 1.109 (1967) (ASPR).
7 Pasley, supra note 6, at 216.
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itself. The Code, when used, becomes a source of the federal law of
contracts only in the light and circumstances of each case. The under-
lying theme of this article is that, in a government contract, the con-
tract provisions are of paramount importance in determining the rights
and duties of the parties.
II. THE CODE AS A SOURCE OF THE FEDERAL LAW OF CONTRACTS
As a general rule, the legal effect of a government contract is
governed by federal rather than state law. 8 Ordinarily, federal law is
applied whenever an essential federal interest is involved; 9 rights and
obligations of the United States on commercial paper are so gov-
erned;" and the operation of state tax upon federal property in hands
of government contractors also presents a question of federal law."
So too, the departure in procurement cases from the rule of Erie R.R.
v. Tompkins' 2 is justified by the principle that the settled procurement
policies of the federal government may not be limited or defeated by
state law. This uniform application of an independent federal common
law is said to protect federal contracts from the vagaries and uncer-
tainties of state law."
The substance of this federal law is commonly derived from fed-
eral statutes and regulations, but in the absence of a controlling statute,
it is the court's duty to fashion the governing rule of law." This
fashioning is ordinarily done from the raw material of state court
decisions or from the common law of contracts." When the federal
interest involved in a particular controversy is relatively unimportant,
state law may be applied." Thus, while there is no federal Uniform
Sales Act and no federal Uniform Commercial Code, the Sales Act
has been regarded as a source of principles for use in deciding govern-
ment contracts cases in the past,' and more recently, the Code has
8 United States v. Lennox Metal Mfg. Co., 225 F.2d 302, 307 (2d Cir. 1955); United
States v. Jones, 176 F.2d 278, 281 (9th Cir. 1949). See also Pofcher, The Choice of Law,
State or Federal in Cases Involving Government Contracts, 12 La. L. Rev. 37 (1951);
Note, Colum. L. Rev. 991 (1953); Note, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 966 (1946).
9 United States v. 93.970 Acres, 360 U.S. 328 (1959); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327
U.S. 392 (1946).
10 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
11 United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174 (1944).
12 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
13 United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. at 183.
14 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 322 U.S. 301, 305 (1947).
15 See, e.g., Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947).
16 United States v. Bradley-Dodson Co., 281 F.2d 676, 681 (8th Cir. 1960); United
States v. H. R. Henderson & Co., 126 F. Supp. 626, 637-38 (W.D. Ark. 1955). See also
United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966), an action to recover on a note issued in
favor of the Small Business Administration. The Court held that the capacity of a mar-
ried woman to contract with the federal government was controlled by state law, despite
the conflict with the national program to assist small business.
n Whitin Mach. Works v. United States, 175 F.2d 504, 507 (1st Cir. 1949) ; Cudahy
3
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become a primary source of federal contract law. An examination of
recent decisions of the Boards of Contract Appeals indicates their readi-
ness to adopt the Code as the basis for some of their decisions. Thus,
section 2-317 has been cited in support of cumulation of warranties?'
sections 2-602, -606, -607 have been decisive on the question of whether
goods have been accepted; to
 section 2-202 has been used to support
admission in evidence of prior negotiations; 20
 section 2-315 has been
cited on implied warranty of fitness and section 2-316(3) to negate
warranty;" the courts have used the section 2-309 definition of a
reasonable time; and section 2-311 has been cited for options respect-
ing performance.'
The Court of Claims and the Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals have ruled that: "As always, the federal contract law we apply
should take account of the best in modern decision and discussion." 24
Since the Code in many respects represents that "best," it has become
an important element in the field of government contracts. In the lan-
guage of Judge Friendly:
We find persuasive the defendant's suggestion of looking
to the Uniform Commercial Code as a source for the "federal"
law of sales. The Code has been adopted by Congress for
the District of Columbia, 77 Stat. 630 (1963), has been
enacted in over forty states, and thus is well on its way to
becoming a truly national law of commerce, which, as Judge
L. Hand said of the Negotiable Instruments Law, is "more
complete and more certain, than any other which can con-
ceivably be drawn from those sources of 'general law' to
which we were accustomed to resort in the days of Swift v.
Tyson." New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Reconstruction Fi-
nance Corp., 180 F.2d 241, 244 (2 Cir. 1950). When the
states have gone so far in achieving the desirable goal of a
uniform law governing commercial transactions, it would be
Packing Co. v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 239 (Ct. Cl. 1948); United States v. Hamden
Co-op. Creamery Co., 185 F. Supp. 541, 547 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); J.R. Simplot Co., 59-1
CCH Bd. Cont. App. Dec. 9059 (ASBCA), modified on rehearing, 59-2 CCH Bd. Cont.
App. Dec. 10,413.
18 General Elec. Co., 65-2 CCH Bd. Cont. App. Dec. 23,454, 23,457-58 (IBCA).
10 Mazur Bros. & Jaffe Fish Co., 65-2 CCH Bd. Cont. App. Dec. 23,303, 23,305
(VACAB).
20 Carpenter Steel Co., 65-1 CCH Bd. Cont. App. Dec. 22,942, 22,944 (AECBCA).
21 Reeves Soundcraft Corp., 1964 CCH Bd. Cont. App. Dec. 20,869, 20,871
(ASBCA).
22 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 1964 CCH Bd. Cont. App. Dec. 21,240, 21,245
(ASBCA).
23 Padbloc Co. v. United States, 161 Ct. Cl. 369, 377 (1963); accord, Reeves Sound-
craft Corp., 1964 CCH Bd. Cont. App. Dec. at 20,870.
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a distinct disservice to insist on a different one for the
segment of commerce, important but still small in relation
to the total, consisting of transactions with the United States.'
The Code has wider application in a dispute between a govern-
ment prime contractor and its subcontractor than in one between the
Government and its contractor. In the former situation, state law,
including any conflict of law rules, is usually applicable. It is not
unreasonable to presume that these two private parties made their
contract in contemplation that local law would govern, although the
contract ultimately involved the furnishing of supplies or services to
the United States. Some commentators have suggested that this rule
is based upon the absence of privity of contract between the govern-
ment and the subcontractor," but a more plausible rationale is the
absence of that direct federal interest which would require the appli-
cation of federal law. Nevertheless, a growing number of cases evi-
dence a tendency to apply federal law to the relations between a
government prime contractor and its subcontractor.'
Two cases have followed that trend where the prime contracts
were affected with the national security. In American Pipe & Steel
Corp. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,' a subcontractor under a
government contract brought suit against the prime contractor to re-
cover additional compensation for extra work he had had to perform
as a result of a defect in the specifications provided him by the con-
tractor. Even though this case was based upon diversity of citizenship,
the application of federal law was upheld on appeal and the prime
contractor prevailed. The court characterized the contract as a "gov-
ernment contract"—one whose interpretation must be uniform through
the entire country. In United States v. R.H. Taylor,' the court de-
cided in favor of the prime contractor, interpreting the "disputes"
article in the contract before it on the basis of federal law. "[I]t is
24 United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1966). The court
sustained the Government's case for damages by applying § 2-615, "Excuse by Failure of
Presupposed Conditions," against a supplier who failed to deliver a computer to the
Government pursuant to the terms of a government contract. See also Transatlantic Fin.
Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966), where § 2-615 was applied to a
non-sales case.
25 Pasley, supra note 6, at 218. See Steele, Choice of Law, State or Federal, in Gov-
ernment Subcontracts, 16 Fed. B.J. 202 (1956).
28 Cases have applied the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec.
Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942). The effect of a release has been held to be a federal question
governed by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Stella v. Kaiser, 221 F.2d 115 (2d
Cir. 1955). And the federal contingent fee policy expressed in Exec. Order No. 9001, 6
Fed. Reg. 6787 (1941), has been used as a basis for ascertaining the federal law in the
subcontract area. Browne v. R & R Eng'r Co., 264 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1959).
27 292 F.2d 640, 643 (9th Cir. 1961).
28 333 F.2d 633, 636-37, aff'd on rehearing, 336 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1964).
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clear that federal law will control contracts between private parties if
there is sufficient federal interest.""
These cases have been criticized on the ground that the federal
interest—avoidance of increased costs to the Government, result-
ing from subcontractor suits involving the application of diverse state
laws—was tenuous.' It is, however, the cases' effect which is mischie-
vous, for these decisions and the recent cases which have cited and ap-
plied the Code as a source of federal law seem to establish the basis
for conflicting results. Whenever a Code rule is different from a federal
common law rule, these cases seem to authorize a court to choose at
random which it will apply. As a practical matter, it would seem that
in subcontract litigation the question of whether to apply state or
federal law is academic. If the courts desire a uniform rule that goal
is more easily attained by application of the Code than through a case-
by-case fashioning of a "uniform federal rule." It would follow that
from the acceptance of the Code by the states and its subsequent
acceptance as a source of federal law that the question should be
solved. Therefore, if the Code is to be rejected in a particular case,
the courts should search for or insist upon a clear standard for deter-
mining what federal interest requires the rejection. Thus, a court may
reject the Code rule in subcontract litigation and follow American
Pipe and Taylor, if it determines that the national security or some
strong federal procurement policy requires a different result. The
ground that the Government does have more than a mere financial
interest in a government subcontract seems to justify such a step.
American Pipe and Taylor dealt with the so-called "changes" 32
and "disputes" 32 clauses. It is perfectly natural, in view of the numer-
ous interpretations placed on these decisions by the courts in cases
between the federal governrnent and its prime contractors, that in
subcontractor litigation, where the contract clauses required by law
or regulation are involved, the federal rule which varies from the Code
may be followed as an exception to the generally accepted Code pro-
visions. In other words, in subcontract litigation the expectation of
the parties that the Code will be applied ought to be fulfilled unless
some paramount federal interest would be thwarted. When clauses
prescribed by federal statute or regulation are involved, the federal
rules should apply. So too, where a clear federal interest relating to
the national security is present, we would expect the federal policy to
be applied by the court. In all other cases, however, failure to apply
the Code defeats the twin goals of uniformity and stability of contract.
29 Id. at 638.
30 Note, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1656 (1962).
31 41 CF.R. § 1-7.101-2 (1967) (FPR); 32 C.F.R. § 7.103-2 (1967) (ASPR).
32 41 CF.R. § 1-7.101-12 (1967) (FPR); 32 CF.R. § 7.103-12 (1967) (ASPR).
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III. CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE CODE AND FEDERAL CONTRACT LAW
A. Formation of Contract
1. Offer and Acceptance. Traditionally, the offeror has complete
control of his offer. It is for him to determine the nature and extent
of the resultant power of acceptance. He can prescribe the mode of
acceptance, and a large number of cases show that an attempt by the
offeree to accept in some manner other than the prescribed one is
inoperative as an acceptance. Where the offer has been ambiguous,
the risk of disappointment has been unfairly placed on the offeree,
rather than on the offeror who caused the trouble."
The Code adopts the rule that:
(1) Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the lan-
guage or circumstances
(a) an offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting
acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable
in the circumstances; . . . 84
There are some federal cases, decided since the enactment of
the Code, that seem to follow the Code rule. In Escote Mfg. Co. v.
United States," a bid on a sale of surplus property was to be accepted
within ten days by the United States. The Government orally notified
the bidder within ten days that his bid had been accepted, but the
contracting officer neglected to sign the required form before mailing
it. The bidder claimed no contract had been formed and brought suit
to recover the bid deposit. The Government counterclaimed for dam-
ages, alleging a breach of contract. The court found a contract had
been formed." It said: "Consequently, an oral contract in this instance
would be just as binding on the plaintiff as well as the Government as
though it were in writing!'"
In another case," an invitation for bids stated that the successful
bidder would be required to execute the standard-form construction
contract. The plaintiff was the low bidder and was authorized by letter
from the contracting officer to start work. Later the project was can-
celled without the execution of the required forms. The court found
a valid contract. While a standard form had been prescribed, neither
33 W. Hawkland, supra note 3, at 5-6.
34 U.C.C. § 2 -206.
35 169 F. Supp. 483 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
36 Accord, Ship Constr. & Trading Co. v. United States, 91 Ct. Cl. 419, 456 (1940).
37 169 F. Supp. at 488.
38 North Am. Iron & Steel Co. v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 723 (E.D.N.Y. 1955).
See also Penn-Ohio Steel Corp. v. United States, 354 F.2d 254 (Ct. Cl. 1965), where
the court held that an oral agreement approved by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
as to a lease modification was binding on the Government and that breach of the oral
agreement rendered the Government liable for damages.
7
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the invitation for bids nor the governing regulations stated that a con-
tract on any other form would be invalid.
These cases appear to apply the Code principle of recognizing an
acceptance by any method reasonable under the circumstances. It may
be argued, however, that the fact that the Armed Services Procurement
Regulations (ASPR) require certain forms means that it is the Gov-
ernment's intent to create a contract only if the prescribed form is
actually executed by the parties, and all other prescribed formalities
for contract review and approval have been met. This contention would
reject the Code standard as applied in the two cases discussed above.
In the absence of special circumstances, the contracting officer
lacks the authority to vary the prescribed form. He is bound by stat-
ute, regulation, and the accepted interpretation of such forms. ASPR
1-102 provides that the regulations shall apply to all purchases and
contracts made by the Department of Defense within or outside the
United States for procurement of supplies or services which obligate
appropriated funds " While the two preceding cases provide a basis
for stating that the contracting officer has the authority to enter into
a contract not authorized by ASPR, another case" would require an
opposite conclusion, and by implication reject the Code rule. In that
case an oral agreement was invalidated on the ground that the General
Services Administration had an established policy of contracting only
on integrated f orms which were to be completed by the plaintiff and
submitted to the agency for approval and execution. Indeed, ASPR
provisions indicate throughout that the Government's intent is to
require acceptance in the manner contained in the regulation, and not
36 32 CF.R. § 1.102 (1967) (ASPR). It is settled law that a government agent may
not exceed his actual authority, and that the doctrines of apparent authority and estoppel
may not be invoked against the Government. Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332
U.S. 380 (1947). Contra, George H. Whike Constr. Co. v. United States, 140 F. Supp.
560 (Ct. Cl. 1956); see McIntire, Authority of Government Officers: Estoppel and Appar-
ent Authority, 25 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 162 (1957).
40 Banking & Trading Corp. v. Floete, 257 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1958). In commenting
on Penn-Ohio Steel Corp. v. United States, 354 F.2d 254 (Ct. Cl. 1965), it has been noted
that:
While this case suggests a trap which may befall a contracting officer who gives
verbal orders, it may not be as powerful a tool as the normal contractor might
like. First, proof problems may present an impossible burden on the contractor
who is seeking to support a "contract" agreed upon in private by only a few
individuals. Second, no agreement may be found to exist when a contractor has
been put on notice that only written instructions will be authoritative and bind-
ing as against the government. Government contracting officers are normally
very cautious in this regard and very few are likely to make such a mistake.
The Penn - Ohio decision, while important, probably doesn't have real significance
in the normal contract between government and contractor. When unusual con-
tractual or administrative arrangements exist, the impact of the decision will
be greater.
Braemer, Recent Developments in Government Contract Law, 22 Bus. Law. 1057, 1063-
64 (1967).
8
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
to allow the easy contract-formation method of the Code. If this is so,
then the use of section 2-206 as a source of federal law may be only
a remote possibility.
Section 2-207, which deals with additional terms, could meet a
similar fate. Section 2-207 was drafted to solve the problem of the
mirror-image rule which required the acceptance to mirror the terms
of the offer. This problem arose from the use of conflicting purchase-
order and acknowledgment forms by buyers and sellers. Although the
forms conflicted, the parties generally felt they were bound by their
agreement."
The Code's attack on this problem is to set up the rule that a
definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confir-
mation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an accep-
tance, even though it states terms additional to or different from those
offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made condi-
tional on assent to the additional or different terms. While section
2-207 was written to correct problems arising out of an exchange of
forms, such exchanges are uncommon in government contracts, for a
contractor merely fills out forms supplied by the Government. Con-
tractors do, however, submit covering letters with their executed docu-
ments and these letters may evidence an understanding of additional
terms. If section 2-207 is applied to such a situation, there is a contract.
The other side of the coin is that under general contract law the con-
tractor would be considered to have made a counteroffer because the
Government's intent was to be bound by the terms of its offer or not
at all.
Section 2-207(2) teaches us that the additional terms are to be
construed as proposals for addition to the contract. Between mer-
chants such additional terms automatically become part of the con-
tract, unless the offer limits acceptance to its terms, the offeror gives
notification of rejection of them within a reasonable time, or the addi-
tional terms materially alter the offer.
In order for the additional terms to become automatically part
of the contract, the Government must be considered a merchant, de-
fined in section 2-104 as "a person who deals in goods of the kind or
otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or
skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved. . . ." In the absence
of any cases, one can only guess whether the Government is a mer-
chant under this definition. In the first place, the Government is not
generally considered to be a "person."'" As to the Government's hav-
ing some particular knowledge or skill, while it might be said to have
91 Hogan, supra note 4, at 44.
4u See, e.g., United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 275 (1947).
9
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the knowledge of all its agents, it seems in reality to be more like a
consumer than a merchant. It thus seems safe to say that the drafts-
man of the Code could not have intended to include the Government.
But even if the Government were a merchant, the fact that it
makes its contracts only through the use of prescribed forms can be
considered the essential equivalent of an express limitation, for the
purpose of section 2-207 is to avoid imposing upon anyone a contract
to which he did not assent. Its probable effect will be to prevent welch-
ing on deals which, once made, later turn out to be undesirable. On
this basis, section 2-207 may find its place in the federal common law
in situations where either the Government or the contractor try to
avoid an agreement on the ground that the government-contract for-
malities were not perfectly observed.
2. The Firm Offer Problem. In the case of private contracts, an
offer not supported by legal consideration may be withdrawn or modi-
fied before the acceptance is mailed." The Government, however,
between the opening of bids and the award, is allowed the time set forth
in the bid, or if none is stated, a reasonable time after opening, in which
to accept or reject. During that period a bid may not be withdrawn
or modified:44
 This doctrine is based upon a rule of policy that all offi-
cers of the Government are required to give careful consideration
to bids submitted to them and they ought to have a reasonable time
for it. In addition, it has been said that if bids could be withdrawn at
will after opening, frauds could be perpetrated against the United
States.45
In comparing government-contract rules and the rules of the
Code relating to firm offers, we find an area where the Code's rule,
in principle, is in agreement with a federal rule of long standing.
A commonly used federal standard-form bid contains a clause which
provides:
In compliance with the above, the undersigned offers and
agrees, if this offer is accepted within  calendar days
(60 calendar days unless a different period is inserted by the
offeror) from the date for receipt of offers specified above, to
furnish any or all items upon which prices are offered, at
the price set opposite each item, delivered at the designated
point(s), within the time specified in the Schedule."
In unsolicited proposals or in proposals submitted to the Govern-
43 1 A. Corbin, Contracts § 146 (1963). Cf. Franklin A. Snow Co. v. Commonwealth,
303 Mass. 511, 22 N.E.2d 599 (1939).
44
 Scott V. United States, 44 Ct. Cl. 524 (1909).
45 Refining Associates Inc. v. United States, 109 F. Supp. 259 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
46 Standard Form 33, Solicitation, Offer, and Award, 41 C.F.R. § 1-16.901-33 (1967)
(FPR).
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ment on other forms, the contractor will often provide that his bid is
firm for a limited period of time. Section 2-205 recognizes that busi-
nessmen frequently make offers which they intend to remain irrevo-
cable for a limited period. The recognition of firm offers is not
surprising, since firm offers are almost universally relied upon by
merchants because of ordinary business ethics. 47
Under section 2-205, if a merchant makes an offer qualifying as
a firm offer, he cannot revoke it for lack of consideration during the
time stated in the offer, or, if no period is stated, for a reasonable time,
but in no event may the period of irrevocability exceed three months.
By way of contrast, in government procurement the offeror need not
be a merchant, although to qualify for award he must be a responsive
and responsible bidder." His offer is irrevocable for the time stated
in the writing, or if none, a reasonable time. There is no three-month
expiration period like the one established by section 2-205, although
in practice the acceptance of bids takes place within 15 to 60 days
from day of opening. This is one significant difference between the
Code and the federal rule.
Section 2-205 also provides that a firm offer contained in a form
supplied by the offeree must be separately signed by the offeror. The
obvious intent of this provision is to guard the offeror against "boiler-
plate" firm offers that he does not want to make and thus, to protect
him against inadvertently binding himelf. Government procurement
is usually accomplished on forms supplied by the offeree government,
but federal law does not require that the firm-offer clause in the con-
tract be separately signed by the offeror. This is another point of
departure between the two rules.
The Government's use of the firm offer in negotiated procurements,
however, is open to question. In formal advertising the Government is
bound by law to either accept the most favorable responsive bid by
a responsible supplier, or reject all bids and start over again." In
negotiated contracts, however, the Government is free to deal with
one who is not the low bidder." Therefore, there is a question of
mutuality of obligation, raised by the fact that the Government is free
to negotiate with one or more of the bidders, while their offers remain
irrevocable."
In the subcontracting area, where the form of the contract is not
governed by regulation, it may be necessary for counsel to draft a
47 E.g., Project, A Comparison of California Sales Law and Article Two of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 10 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 1087 (1963).
48 See 41 C.F.R. § 1-2.103(c) (1967) (FPR); 32 C.P.A. § 2.103(d) (FPR).
49 10 U.S.C. § 2305 (1964).
99 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (1964).
51 Pasley, Formation of Government Contracts—Application of Common Law Prin-
ciples—A Reply, 40 Cornell L.Q. 518, 520-24 (1955).
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firm offer.' For example, a prime contractor will want to receive ir-
revocable offers from his subcontractors upon which to base his own
bid to the federal government. He will, therefore, need to draft offers
which incorporate a firm-offer provision to be used by the subcontrac-
tors.
If the subcontractor is not a merchant or if the offer is not one
for the purchase or sale of goods, section 2-205 does not apply and
the matter is probably governed by the general rules of the contract.
But if the offer is within 2-205, the prime contractor must determine
how long he wants the offer kept open. This will depend upon the
nature of the goods, the nature of the market, and the expectations
of the customers.
Many other problems may attend a firm offer. It may be ins
portant to specify the manner of acceptance, for the offeree might
select a manner that takes more time than the offeror expects. Perhaps
it ought to clearly provide what happens if the cut-off date arrives
and the offeree has not accepted. It should clearly specify that the
offer then terminates or will continue to remain open, subject to revo-
cation. Finally, the clause should specify any contingencies, the hap-
pening of which may revoke the offer, for the offeror's supply or price
might be subject to war, weather, or labor difficulties.
But in contracting directly with the Government, a bidder has
no opportunity to protect himself. This is clearly shown by the case of
Refining Associates, Inc. v. United States." There, a bidder submitted
its bid for a procurement of oil lubricants using a government form
which contained language prohibiting the withdrawal of bids after
opening. After opening, the bidder nevertheless attempted to withdraw
because of a strike. The Government accepted the bid, and the court
held the offeror's revocation ineffective to prevent formation of a valid
contract. The court noted that the strike had begun one month before
the bid was submitted and that there was no evidence of its inter-
ference with performance.
Under the Code, the result would be no different. But under the
Code, the bidder would have been able to qualify his offer. With re-
spect to the government forms, a qualified firm offer would undoubt-
edly be unresponsive. Thus, although the federal and Code rules on
firm offers are parallel, they are not without conflicts.
B. Warranties
1. In General. The Uniform Commercial Code has not altered
many of the traditional notions of liability arising from warranties.
52 For a discussion of various forms of firm offers, see I California Continuing Edu-
cation of the Bar, California Commercial Code §§ 3.17-.22 (1966),
53 109 F. Supp. 259 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
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It is, in fact, extremely doubtful whether any provision of the war-
ranty sections of the Code does not find its basis in cases decided un-
der the Sales Act. The Code continues to classify warranties under
two headings, expressed and implied. Perhaps the most radical change
is the reclassification of the warranties of description and sample
as express warranties. Yet it is merely a reclassification and the im-
port of it is likely to be slight, for the legal effect of making an express
warranty is the same as that of giving an implied warranty. The Code
retains the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose with few
changes. While the Uniform Sales Act required that the buyer make
known to the seller, expressly or by implication, a particular purpose
for which he wanted the goods, the Code requires only that the seller
have reason to know of the particular purpose.' The heart of this
warranty is still reliance by the buyer on the seller's skill or judgment
in selecting the goods, but one troublesome provision of the Sales Act
has been eliminated: the exception that there was no warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose where the sale was of "a specified
article under its patent or trade name. . . .""
The wording of the Code section on the warranty of merchant-
ability is considerably different from that of the former Sales Act, but
it is doubtful whether any significant substantive change has been
effected. Under the old law, the warranty of merchantability attached
only to sales "by description." This was largely ignored by the courts
and the limitation has been eliminated by the Code. The Sales Act
provided that the warranty of merchantability arose when goods were
purhased from a seller "who deals in goods of that description (whether
he be the grower or manufacturer or not). . . ."" Under the Code,
the warranty is imposed when the seller is a merchant. Unlike the
Uniform Sales Act, the Code's statutory language gives some guide as
to what is "merchantable," but the enumeration is far from exhaus-
tive."
2. Disclaimer of Warranties. The most interesting questions raised
by the Code and by recent government-procurement cases involve the
modification or limitation of a seller's warranties by disclaimer clauses.
In the pre-Code law the courts developed several important limitations
upon warranty liability. One of the most significant of these restric-
tions was the recognition of the contractual disclaimer under which
the seller sought to escape some or all of his warranty obligations."
54 Compare Uniform Sales Act § 150), with U.C.C. § 2-315.
55 Uniform Sales Act § 15(4).
56 Uniform Sales Act § 15(2).
57 	§ 2-314(2).
58 Uniform Sales Act § 71; see also Shafer v. Reo Motors, Inc , 205 F.2d 685 (3d
Cir. 1953), where a disclaimer clause covering all obligations or liabilities precluded
negligence liability.
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The Code makes a substantial alteration in the prior law, ruling that
the disclaimer is inoperative if it is inconsistent with any express war-
ranty." Although a court is directed to construe the two provisions
as consistent with each other whenever reasonable, where such a con-
struction is not reasonable, then the disclaimer will apparently be
inoperative."
With respect to government procurement, the standard "Inspec-
tion" clause for fixed-price contracts provides: "Except as otherwise
provided in this contract, acceptance shall be conclusive except as
regards latent defects, fraud, or such gross mistakes as amount to
fraud."" (Emphasis added.) In the absence of a warranty clause in
the contract itself any warranty that would otherwise survive accep-
tance is precluded from doing so by the use of the word "conclusive."
The reason for the rule is that government purchases usually involve
items of special manufacture, which are fabricated pursuant to govern-
ment specifications, and the only warranty implicitly given by the con-
tractor to the Government is his promise that the items conform to
the Government's specifications." Thus, despite the fact the Code is
considered a source of federal law, the word "conclusive" in the stan-
dard "Inspection" clause operates as a limitation on warranty liability.
The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals has recently
held that acceptance under the standard "Inspection" clause eliminates
the possibility of any government recovery for breach of warranty
under the Code. In Republic Aviation Corp.," the Air Force found
that some three hundred F-105D aircraft, 21 of which had been ac-
cepted by the Government, did not meet the contract requirements
for adequate spacing between tubing and wiring. This caused chafing
of tubing and wiring while the aircraft was in flight, and threatened
flight safety. As to the 21 accepted aircraft, the Air Force contended
that the contractor was obligated to correct the chafing condition at
its own expense even though the Government had accepted. The Gov-
ernment alleged that the contractor had given an oral promise that
the spacing would prove adequate under flight conditions and that any
deficiencies would be remedied by quality control. This promise, it
was argued, together with the contract specification for prevention
of chafing constituted a warranty entitling the Government to recover
under the Code.
The Board rejected these contentions, saying:
§ 2-316(1).
60 See Alaska Pac. Salmon Co. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 163 F.2d 643 (2d Cir. 1947).
61 41 C.F.R. § 1-7.101-5(d) (1967) (FPR); 32 C.F.R. § 7.103-5(a)(d) (1967)
(ASPR).
02 46 Am. Jur. Sales § 352 (1943).
63 66-1 CCH Bd. Cont. App. Dec. 25,679 (ASBCA).
14
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
There is no contention that latent defects, fraud or gross
mistake amounting to fraud, are involved here. Acceptance
was conclusive, therefore, unless it was "otherwise provided
in this contract." There is no written warranty or any other
provision in the contract which provides "otherwise." The
Government does refer to the contract specifications regard-
ing prevention of chafing but these are not warranties which
survive acceptance. Oral warranties outside the contract like-
wise are not covered by this exception.
The decision in REEVES does not support the Govern-
ment's position. The contract involved there ... did not con-
tain the standard Inspection article found in this case. In the
absence of express provisions in that simple purchase order,
the Uniform Commercial Code was applied. Our decision in
this case is controlled by the Inspection article. The sections
of the Uniform Commercial Code cited are therefore not ap-
plicable. We conclude that the Air Force's direction under
Contract 40838 to modify the 21 accepted aircraft, was a
change to that contract." (Emphasis added.)
The Republic Aviation decision is noteworthy for two reasons.
First, it confirms the time-honored interpretation of the word "con-
clusive" so as to preclude the operation against the contractor of any
implied warranty after the Government has accepted. Second, it re-
jects the Code provisions dealing with implied warranties because they
are considered to be inconsistent with the contract. The point is that
the word "conclusive" in the standard "Inspection" article was held
to be an express disclaimer of implied warranties under the facts of
the Republic Aviation case, thus barring the Government's remedies
for breach of warranty.
3. Cumulation of Warranties. Numerous decisions recognize and
apply the rule of cumulation of remedies 8 6 Code section 2-317, in
part, provides for this rule of construction in these words:
Warranties whether express or implied shall be construed
as consistent with each other, and as cumulative, but if such
construction is unreasonable the intention of the parties shall
determine which warranty is dominant.
64 Id. at 25,694. In Reeves Soundcraft, 1964 CCH Bd. Cont. App. Dec. 20,869
(ASBCA), the Board applied the implied warranty provisions of the Code, holding on the
merits that there was no implied warranty in favor of the Government. The case is not
considered controlling, since the contract form involved was DOD Form 1270, which is
not used for most government purchases, and which does not contain the standard
"Inspection" clause found in Republic Aviation. See Borden, Government Contract War-
ranties Under the New ASPR Provisions, 25 Fed. B.J. 248, 249 (1965).
65 Annot., 164 A.L.R. 1321, 1325, 1334 (1964).
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In two cases, Federal Pac. Elec. Co." and General Elec. Co.,"
the Board of Contract Appeals has perhaps too quickly applied this
rule in holding contractors liable for latent defects. The contracts in
both cases contained the following provisions: (1) the standard "In-
spection" article, which declares final acceptance to be conclusive,
except for latent defects, fraud, or gross mistakes amounting to fraud;
(2) a clause indicating that acceptance of material or components
does not relieve the contractor of responsibility for meeting specifi-
cation requirements; and (3) a guarantee clause, which authorizes
repair or replacement of equipment which fails in operation within
one year from date of completion of installation due to defects in
design, material or workmanship, notwithstanding that final acceptance
and payment may have been made." In Federal Pacific a circuit
co 1964 CCH Bd. Cont. App. Dec. 21,582 (IBCA).
or 65-2 CCH Bd. Cont. App. Dec. 23,454 (IBCA).
Os The contract was executed on Standard Form 33 (Revised June 1955) and
incorporated the General Provisions of Standard Form 32 (November 1949 Edi-
tion), which included a standard Inspection clause (Clause 5). Paragraph (d)
of that clause reads as follows:
"(d) The inspection and test by the Government of any supplies or lots thereof
does not relieve the contractor from any responsibility regarding defects or other
failures to meet the contract requirements which may be discovered prior to
final acceptance. EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THIS CON-
TRACT, FINAL ACCEPTANCE SHALL BE CONCLUSIVE EXCEPT AS
REGARDS LATENT DEFECTS, FRAUD, OR SUCH GROSS MISTAKE AS
AMOUNTS TO FRAUD." (Emphasis supplied).
The Supplementary General Provisions contained a clause relating to responsi-
bility for the equipment following acceptance, which reads as follows:
"108. ACCEPTANCE DOES NOT RELIEVE CONTRACTOR OF RESPON-
SIBILITY. The acceptance of material or equipment or parts thereof or waiving
of inspection will in no way relieve the contractor of responsibility for furnish-
ing material or equipment or parts thereof meeting the requirements of these
specifications."
The Supplementary General Provisions also included a clause which required,
among other things, that all materials should be free from defects. It reads as
follows:
"109. MATERIAL AND WORKMANSHIP. Material and workmanship shall
be of the type and grade most suitable for the application and as far as prac-
ticable shall conform, unless otherwise specified, to the latest applicable stan-
dards, specifications, recommended practices, and procedures of such standard-
izing bodies as the Federal Specifications Board, ASTM, AIEE, ASME, NEMA,
and ASA. All materials shall be of recent manufacture, unused and free from
defects." ... .
The Guarantee Clause of the Supplemental General Provisions provided, in
pertinent part, that:
"112. CONTRACTOR'S GUARANTEE. A. The contractor guarantees that
equipment furnished under the contract meets all the requirements of these
specifications.
"B. The Contractor hereby agrees to repair or replace any equipment or part
thereof which fails in operation during normal and proper use within one year
from date of completion of installation due to defects in design, material or
workmanship, notwithstanding that final acceptance and payment, may have
been consummated; Provided, however, that in each case the contracting officer
shall have promptly forwarded written notice of such failure to the Contractor
16
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breaker failed. The Board found that the defect had been caused by
an improperly laminated insulator column. The Government's claim
arose subsequent to inspection, acceptance and expiration of the
agreed guaranty period set forth in the contract. The contractor was
held liable for the cost of repairing not only the defective component
but all damaged portions of the item. In General Electric, a defect in
an auto-transformer was not discovered for more than three years
while the contract itself limited the contractor's liability for latent
defects to one year. The contractor was nevertheless held liable.
Since the first and third provisions of the contracts enumerated
above conflict to some extent, the cases clearly depend upon a holding
that the warranties will be construed as consistent with each other.
The standard "Inspection" clause contained the traditional phrase,
"Except as otherwise provided in this contract, final acceptance shall
be conclusive except as regards latent defects...." The phrase "Except
as otherwise provided in this contract" is the draftsman's signal to
look elsewhere in the contract for any modification to the provision."
The contract in Federal Pacific and General Electric does provide
otherwise with respect to the conclusiveness of acceptance in the
"guarantee" clause which limits the warranty to twelve months. The
two clauses should be read together because they are similar provisions.
Since the "guarantee" clause does not contain a phrase such as "Not-
withstanding any other provision of this contract," the draftsman prob-
ably intended that the Government, in consideration of the broad
and specific remedies contained in the "guarantee" clause, was willing
and Provided Further, that in case installation is delayed for more than six (6)
months after the date of preliminary acceptance at destination by conditions
beyond the control of the contractor, this guarantee shall remain in full force
and effect for a period of eighteen (18) months from date of preliminary accep-
tance at destination regardless of the date of completion of installation. All
replacements of equipment or parts thereof as a result of failures after final
acceptance shall be made promptly and free of charge f.o.b. destination. The
cost of installing these replacements after final acceptance shall be borne by the
Government."
Id. at 23,454-55. See also Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 1964 CCH Bd. Cont. App. Dec. 21,582
(IBCA).
" Cf. McGrath & Co., 58-1 CCH Bd. Cont. App. Dec. 5818 (ASBCA), holding that
the Government has no rights under the general law of warranty unless specifically re-
served by a warranty clause:
We think it to be clear that when the words "Except as otherwise provided in
this contract" in the Inspection article are read together with the words "Not-
withstanding the provisions of the clause of this contract entitled `Inspection'"
in the Guaranty article, the conclusiveness that would otherwise attach to the
"final acceptance" does not attach in view of the Guaranty article. Because of
the Guaranty article the "final acceptance" is not conclusive when, at the time
of delivery and without the knowledge of the Government, the articles accepted
did not conform to the requirements of the contract and/or were not free from
defects in material and workmanship.
Id. at 5825.
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to limit its undefined rights under the "inspection" clause. The wording
of the contract provision entitled "Acceptance Does not Relieve Con-
tractor of Responsibilitym° does not contradict this reasoning because
it obviously was intended to govern acceptance effected during the
progress of the work. This provision applies to equipment and material
whereas the provision in the standard "Inspection" clause deals with
final acceptance. From this analysis, it should be clear that the Gov-
ernment included the "guarantee" provision in the contract, not to
cumulate its remedies, but to obtain a more specific statement of its
warranty rights. Had the Board relied more upon the contract and
federal procurement policy than upon the Code, it would have been
conscious of the unique nature of a government contract and would
not have adopted the Code rule.
Another factor which the Board should have appreciated in decid-
ing this question is that in bidding on the job the contractors probably
did not have notice of the Government's extensive warranty rights.
If they had, they would have raised their prices to provide for con-
tingencies, and this would work to the eventual disadvantage of the
Government. There is no question that the cost to the Government
for the inclusion of a warranty clause in a contract is a most important
factor. The result of these decisions will be a general rise in govern-
ment-procurement costs.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE
CODE AND PRIOR LAW
We have pointed out that the Code has been used to some extent
in government-procurement cases and have concluded that the number
of cases in which it will be applied will continually increase. But this
leaves unanswered the question of what ought to be done in those
cases where the Code and federal contract law would bring about con-
flicting results. Basically, government contract law and the legal prin-
ciples contained in the Code represent two different types of legal
machinery. The Code is built around layman's arrangements. On the
other hand, the government contract is not only a formal document
calling for the furnishing of supplies and services, but also a vehicle
for the implementation of public or administrative policies!' A conse-
quence of this dichotomy is that implementation of the Code in
government-procurement cases may tend to be an unsettling influence
in a multi-faceted and dynamic field of law. There are, however, some
7° Supra note 68.
71 It is clear that the procurement power has become a powerful mechanism for
enforcement of many public policies. See Miller, Administration by Contract: A New
Concern for the Administrative Lawyer, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 957 (1961); Hannah, Govern-
ment by Procurement, 18 Bus. Law. 997 (1963); Stone, Contract by Regulation, 29 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 32 (1964).
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basic considerations which, if kept in mind, will guide the courts in
avoiding conflicts between the Code and government-contract law, so
that the Code may receive optimum use in this important field.
Conflict can frequently be avoided by carefully construing the
contract before looking to the Code. To construe any contract is to
interpret the contract terms to conform to the intention of the parties.
The purpose of the transaction is ordinarily found in the plain mean-
ing of the contract, liberally and realistically construed to achieve
the contractual goals. This is especially true when a government con-
tract is being construed; the provisions of a government contract are
all there for a purpose, and every sentence, virtually every word, has
some legal significance. 72 This is, of course, the most general and basic
of contract rules, but it remains the fundamental rule which must be
constantly kept in mind.
A second basic consideration is the purpose of procurement itself.
Every procurement contract is intended to get the goods to the user
when and where he needs them to fulfill his changing and growing
needs. Any uncertainty as to the meaning or possible interpretation
of the words of the contract will have a tendency to cause uncertainty
as to the rights and duties of the parties and this will, in certain cases,
cause a lag in the constant flow of goods so necessary to the Govern-
ment's efficient operation. It is clear that the purpose of procurement
will best be served by the application of rules of law which will be
a source of certainty in future transactions.
A neat example of a case which recognizes this is the recent case
of United States v. Wegematic Corp." The United States had re-
quested bids for a computer. Wegematic, in response to the bid, sub-
mitted a detailed proposal, characterizing the machine as "a truly
revolutionary system utilizing all of the latest technical advances."
72 In United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 9 CCH Cont. Cas. F. ¶ 72,181 (4th Cir.
1963), the court was asked to construe a government contract under which the con-
tractor had obtained an option to purchase certain facilities, less depreciation on each
item. The court held that the facilities, but not the land, were subject to depreciation.
Judge Michie set the tone for handling this type of problem by the following statement:
This case essentially involves the problem of the lawyer who drafts a contract
and, in the beginning, provides that, when used in the contract, the word
"black" shall mean "white" and vice versa. Of course the law will accord him the
same privilege that Humpty-Dumpty claimed in "Alice in Wonderland" [sic:
Through the Looking Glass] when he said: "When I use a word it means just
what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less." But suppose our lawyer for-
gets his definition and later, obviously quite accidentally, uses white as meaning
white or black as meaning black in the ordinary sense. What do we do then?
Well, if we can be sure that he is using the word in its ordinary sense, we think
that we must forget his definition and construe the word to mean what we are
sure he intended it to mean. And this we think we should do here.
Id. at 62,484.
73 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966).
19
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Delivery was to be made within nine months after the date the contract
was received. Subsequently, Wegematic encountered problems in per-
formance of the machine which caused it to default on its contract.
Wegematic's defense, on appeal, was that delivery was made impos-
sible by basic engineering difficulties, and that the practical impossi-
bility of completing the contract excused its defaults in performance.
While the court found the Government's legal authorities not to be
controlling, it did hold under Code section 2-615 that the risk should
fall on Wegematic rather than the Government, owing to the fact that
Wegematic had promoted the machine.
The case represents a recognition of the nature of procurement
because it regards the transaction itself as controlling the manner in
which the risks should be allocated, and it establishes a uniform rule
with respect to the federal law of sales by applying section 2-615. In
doing so, the court meets the necessity for uniformity and certainty
in government-procurement transactions. It does so in another way
by holding the seller to his promise and as a result of a breach of
that promise by making him liable in damages, rather than granting
him an option to compel the Government to pay if the gamble should
pan out.
The third basic factor which must be considered in procurement
contracts is the absence of any real negotiations, a fact which sets
government contracts apart from other types of agreements. Moreover,
it is clear that, even when there is negotiation, the bargaining power
of the Government far outweighs that of the contractor. If this power
were left uncurbed, the result would be to place far too much power
in the hands of individual bureaucrats, for strict interpretation of all
clauses would place the power of the federal government behind their
every act. Thus, it seems to be necessary that in all cases, that rule
will be preferred which will be a deterrent to an abuse of authority
and which will deter inequitable government action or inaction. The
board or the court which construes the contract must impose a rule
of fairness on the parties' dispute. This rule appears in several forms.
It may be applied where the Government's conduct is unconscion-
able. Thus, the Court of Claims has found, "an implied provision
of every contract [is] ... that neither party . . . will do anything to
prevent performance thereof by the other party or that will hinder
or delay him in its performance." 74
 There is also an implied duty to
furnish to the contractor information that is unknown to the contractor
and material to the written bargain of the parties. The rule has been
applied where undisclosed pricing information indicated that the nego-
tiated price should have been higher or where the Government had
74 George A. Fuller Co. v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 409, 411 (Ct. Cl. 1947).
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withheld vital technical information." The principles of estoppel have
been invoked where the contractor was induced to sign a contract on
the representations of the lawyers of the contracting officer with respect
to the meaning of the contract. 76 Refusals to enforce penalty provisions
have their roots in the same precepts." Equitable principles may also
be used to mitigate abuses of authority or unduly harsh application
of legal rules.
Finally, it must be remembered that government contracts carry
with them programs which have wide-ranging consequences with re-
spect to our society and economy. Whenever one of the procurement
regulations is construed, the importance of the policy which underlies
it must be assessed and given great weight in determining the rights
and obligations of the contracting parties. Implicit in every such regu-
lation are the conflicting factors of government efficiency and public
confidence in the fairness of government-contract policies. These fac-
tors may require results which would not normally occur in a com-
mercial contract case.
A dramatic example of this is the case of G. L. Christian & Asso-
ciates v. United States," in which a contract was made for the con-
struction of a Capehart Housing Project for the Federal Housing
Administration. ASPR required that the contracting officer put a ter-
mination clause in the contract providing an equitable amount to be
paid for the termination of the contract, but precluding the payment
of damages for the contractors' loss of anticipated profits. The clause
was not included in the contract and the contractor argued that the
omitted clause did not control the amount it could recover because
of the Government's termination action. The Court of Claims read the
termination clause required by ASPR 8-703 into the Christian contract
even though it was not there. The decision may be rationalized on the
ground that the public policy inherent in the Government's termina-
tion regulation precludes a contractor from recovering anticipatory
profits upon the contract's termination, even though the contract is
silent on the amount of recovery. In reality, the court designed a rule
to preclude an overexpenditure of public funds.
Paul v. United States" is another illustration of the paramount
importance that is given to the public policy underlying the procure-
ment regulations. In this case, the Supreme Court relied on the Armed
75 Helene Curtis Indus. Inc. v. United States, 312 F.2d 774, 778 (Ct. CI. 1963) ;
Snyder-Lynch Motors, Inc. v. United States, 292 F.2d 907 (Ct. CI. 1961).
76 George H. Whike Constr. Co. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 560 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
77 Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947); United States v. United
Eng'r & Contracting Co., 234 U.S. 236 (1914).
78 312 F.2d 418, rehearing denied, 320 F.2d 345 (Ct. CI.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
954 (1963).
79 371 U.S. 245 (1963).
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Services Procurement Regulation for competitive procurement to hold
invalid California's minimum price regulation as applied to milk sold
to military installations. The Court distinguished Penn Dairies, Inc. v.
Milk Control Conznen" in which Chief Justice Stone had stated that
federal procurement legislation disclosed no purpose to override non-
discriminatory state milk marketing regulations. In Paul, Justice Doug-
las, speaking for the Court, held that ASPR having the force of law
commands that purchases of the armed services be made on a com-
petitive basis.
The courts and the Board will undoubtedly continue to look to
the Code as a source of federal law because it represents the best of
modern authority. Whether they will do so where the Code conflicts
with prior doctrines is, as yet, an unresolved question. We have sug-
gested three basic principles which should keep such conflicts to a
minimum: (1) Because of the nature of procurement the rule of law
which will be a source of certainty in future transactions should be
preferred; (2) Because the Government has an overriding bargaining
power the rule which will best deter abuse of authority and inequi-
table government action or inaction should be preferred; (3) Because
government contracts serve important social ends the rule which will
best effectuate those ends should be preferred. To a large extent these
are competing principles. They are advanced as guides, since choices
must be made. The contract and the surrounding facts will ultimately
determine which choice will be made.
89 318 U.S. 261 (1943).
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